



Masarat

The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran Reappears after a 20-Year Hiatus: *Is it a Real or an Imagined Threat to the Islamic Republic?*

Introduction

The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran Before 1979

The Kurdish Use of Arms Against the Islamic Republic

Recent Clashes

Potential Reasons for KDPI's Sudden Change in Direction

The Effect of the Clashes on Kurds in Iran

The Effect of Recent Clashes on the IRGC

Is the KDPI a real or imagined threat to the Islamic Republic?

Relationship between the Recent Executions of Kurdish Religious

Activities with the Recent KDPI Clashes

Conclusion

Masarat

© KFCRIS, 2016

ISSN: 1658-6972

Issue No. 26 - 24/08/2016

L.D. No: 1437/2868





Introduction

When Mustafa Hijri, the secretary-general of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (*Hezbî Dêmokratî Kurdistanî Êran*, also known as *Partî Dêmokratî Kurdistanî Êran*), invited young Iranian Kurds to join his party in a speech delivered on March 2016, several Kurdish analysts and activists interpreted his message as an attempt to restart the *xebati chekdari*, which authorized the use of arms against the government of the Islamic Republic. Others were less convinced. As the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) has taken up arms in the provinces of Iranian Kurdistan and Iranian Azerbaijan, clashing with government forces, tensions [between who and who?] increased, with uncertain consequences. What are the fundamental effects of such disturbances on the government of the Islamic Republic, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Iran's neighbors, as well as Iranian Kurds? Will there be additional clashes, or can Tehran find a way to accommodate with one of its most critical minority populations? What would it take for the Islamic Republic to confront legitimate internal challenges raised by Iranian Kurds?

The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran Before 1979

The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) is one of nine Kurdish political parties operating in Iran. The other eight, which share the aim of advancing Kurdish national rights within a federal system, include the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Komala, Toilers Komala, the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan, the Organization of Iranian Kurdistan Struggle, the Revolutionary Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Freedom Party, and the Kurdistan Independent Party. The KDPI was founded by Qazi Muhammad in the city of Mahabad on August 16, 1945. On January 22, 1946, Qazi Muhammad declared the independent Kurdish Republic in Mahabad and assumed its presidency. While the republic was supported by the Soviet Union, it fell to the Imperial Iranian Army when Moscow withdrew from the area. The Soviet retreat

from occupied Iranian territories in December 1946, and the subsequent occupation by the Iranian army, which quickly reconquered Iranian Azerbaijan, followed by Mahabad, ended KDPI ambitions to either live in an independent state or, at least, join a federal system. The fall of the Mahabad Republic took place in a series of military clashes: several KDPI leaders were promptly arrested and most were executed, effectively bringing both the Republic as well as the party to an end.

A few surviving KDPI cadres cooperated with the Tudeh [Communist] party in a short-lived revival during the premiership of Mohammad Mossadegh, which collapsed after Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi regained full control of Iran in 1953.¹ Within five years, and as various Kurdish parties consolidated their widespread constituencies, the KDPI planned

to unify with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq, when the Shah's secret police forces in the **Organization of Intelligence and National Security** (*Sāzemān-e Ettlā'āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar*, or SAVAK), infiltrated the Kurdish group and successfully dismantled it from within. What survived of this purge of the KDPI aligned with the KDP, until the Shah embarked on a full-fledged administrative effort to undermine all existing political relationships between and among various Iranian parties. In a diabolic plot, Tehran extended assistance to the KDP inside Iraq, presumably to fight against the Iraqi government, which was known to provide aid and comfort to the KDPI. In other words, both the KDPI and the KDP were royally manipulated by Tehran, and to a lesser extent by Baghdad, to serve their own regional interests, without regard for Kurdish concerns or cultural autonomy.

In response to its circumstances, the KDPI reorganized its leadership ranks, sidelining its pro-KDP chief 'Abdallah Ishaqi (also known as Ahmad Tawfiq), adding new communist and nationalist members, and forming the Revolutionary Committee to continue its struggle against the Shah's regime, which sought to combine all nationalities in Iran under a Persian mantle. It further appointed a new leader, Dr. 'Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, who pledged various reforms even as the KDPI gradually aligned itself with Shi'ah Islamist and anti-Shah Marxist factions in the conflicts that culminated in the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Notwithstanding this rapprochement, which was quickly dismissed by 'Ayatullah Ruhallah Khomeini (whose aversion of leftist and ethnic opposition groups was well known,) the move backfired. Marginalized, the KDPI mimicked other neglected groups as it embarked on an armed resistance against the newly declared Islamic Republic, though its resources were limited. Scores of KDPI members were either killed outright in the battles that ensued, fell into the Khomeini dragnet, or were

forced into exile, which effectively eradicated the party. Afterwards, all KDPI activities continued in exile, as diehard partisans maintained hope of achieving national rights for Kurds within a democratic, federal and secular Iran.

Ghassemlou, the KDPI Secretary-General who led the party between 1973 and 1989, held on to the belief that he could negotiate with the revolutionary regime since he had been an early backer of Khomeinists in 1979. The Ayatollah disagreed, perceiving the KDPI and others with similar intentions as being opportunistic partisans, whose quests for a federalist Iran contravened his *velayat-e-faqih* [Guardianship of the jurists] platform. On July 13, 1989, while engaged in negotiation with Iranian representatives, Ghassemlou was assassinated in Vienna, Austria. Sadik Sharafqandi, Ghassemlou's deputy, then became the leader of the party, but he too was assassinated in 1992 in Berlin, Germany. Sharafqandi was murdered at a restaurant called Mykonos, a crime that created a diplomatic incident between Germany and Iran and a full-fledged trial, which became known as the "Mykonos Trial." The German court accused major Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, then-president Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, and intelligence minister Ali Fallahian, of knowledge of and involvement in the assassination. Following Sharafqandi's death, Abdallah Hasanzadeh assumed leadership of the party, and in the most recent electoral congress in 2012, Mustafa Hijri was elected leader.

At first, the party accepted Hijri's leadership, but after a short time dissatisfaction emerged among Mahabadian members, backers of the writer and children's rights activist Reza Mahabadian who believed that the party leader should be of Mahabadian origin. In 1998, the Mahabadian faction separated from the party and founded the *Partî Dêmokratî Kurdistan/Hezbi Dêmokratî Kurdistan* (PDK/HDK), also known as the Kurdistan Democratic Party



(KDP). Led by a Mahabadian, Khalid Azizi, the KDP stood apart, and while Kurdish leaders repeatedly attempted to unify it with the KDPI, all efforts so far have failed. As of 2016, both parties are based in Koye, in the Kurdistan Autonomous

Region (in Iraq), and both claim to follow the objectives of their previous leaders. Both have embarked on major propaganda broadcasts on separate satellite channels, though both have recently suffered because of financial difficulties.

The Kurdish Use of Arms Against the Islamic Republic

The best known instance of Kurdish parties taking up arms against the Islamic Republic regime occurred shortly after the 1979 Revolution in Iran. After Ayatollah Rohallah Khomenei's ascent to power and the dominance of his Islamist factions over the leftist and regionalist elements that fought during the revolution against the Shah, Kurdish and other ethnic groups, as well as various leftist parties, were systematically excluded from the nascent "republic." At a time when every member of society was presumably called upon to join hands and rebuild the nascent Islamic State, participation in the formation of the new regime quickly took on sectarian and ethnic overtones, even though individuals from many sociocultural backgrounds had joined together in the struggle against the Shah. In the years that followed the 1979 Revolution, Kurdish parties sporadically launched armed attacks against the regime, without any conclusive results,

both on account of their limited roles and because they operated with shoestring capabilities that seldom threatened the mullahs.

Following the Iran-Iraq War and until 2003, the Kurdish parties – Kumaleh, the Kurdistan Communist Party, KDPI and KDP – put their arms aside. In 2003, however, the newly-formed *Parti Jiani Azad Kurdistan* (PJAK) or Free Life Party of Kurdistan, took up arms against government forces. Other Kurdish parties either condemned PJAK actions or opted to remain silent. More recently, the KDPI restarted the *Xebati Chekdari*, its armed wing, and claimed that members only entered the Kurdish parts of Iran and used arms in self-defense against IRGC assaults on Kurdish positions. It should be mentioned that in the June 2016 armed clashes in Mahabad, which occurred between the KDPI and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the KDP was not involved.²

Recent Clashes

The most recent clashes between the KDPI and government forces followed an announcement by the KDPI's secretary-general, Mustafa Hijri, in which he urged Kurdish youth to join its ranks and

participate in the liberation struggle throughout the area. Hijri's statement, made to mark the Persian New Year, Nowruz, was interpreted as a call to renew Kurdish armed resistance against the

Islamic Republic. Clashes erupted in late June 2016 between KDPI fighters and the IRGC, with each side claiming to have inflicted heavy casualties on the other. Because of the tight controls over all media sources in Iran, the true number of casualties on both sides was unclear, as both the KDPI and the IRGC have obfuscated their data in the past, ostensibly to minimize public reactions to high casualty figures.

Here's what's known of the clashes, which started on June 15-16, 2016 in Sheno in the West Azerbaijan province of Iran, and were followed by skirmishes in the nearby towns of Sarwawa, Mahabad, and

Marivan in Iranian Kurdistan. According to a June 28, 2016 IRGC report, its forces killed 11 Kurdish "rebels" in the Sarwawa region after Peshmerga [Kurdish troops literally known as those who confront death] elements attacked them. An IRGC commander, Muhammad Hussain Rajabi, admitted that three of his troops were also killed in the clashes. For its part, the KDPI claimed that several of its fighters and more than 20 IRGC members were killed, and accused Iranian forces of shelling villages in the border region over the course of a long weekend that started peacefully but ended in utter chaos.

Potential Reasons for KDPI's Sudden Change in Direction

While opinions differed as to the root causes of the KDPI's abrupt adoption of new and more aggressive tactics against Iranian authorities, various theories emerged in recent months to explain the transformation. Some observers believed that Iran's neighbors, as well as global powers, stood behind the recent resurgence in KDPI activities. Iranian Kurdish political activist Hadi 'Azizi maintained that the KDPI was engaged in legitimate self-defense against the Islamic Republic, avowing that Iranian Kurds were ready and able to protect themselves. He did not believe that external elements instigated these attacks, arguing that neither Kurdish forces nor the Islamic Republic enjoyed critical support within the international community. Furthermore, Azizi believed that the clashes in Iran would not affect the government of Iraqi Kurdistan, pointing out that Iraqi Kurdistan's Regional Government established relatively strong and reliable relationships with world powers like the United States, Russia, and

some European countries, though that did not necessarily translate into a carte blanche for Kurds to go on the offensive. Rather, whatever support Kurds managed to secure was tied to the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), whose fighters tried to launch attacks inside Iraqi Kurdistan. Whenever such clashes occurred, Washington and its allies extended military assistance. In contrast, they took no special action when ISIS threatened Mosul and occupied it on June 10, 2014. Political analyst Sadiq Hassan Shukru [no sure of name—please double check], who lives in Erbil, disagreed with Azizi. He maintained that these clashes signaled the beginning of a new era, since historically in Iran there was no such thing as an armed Kurdish strategy. Shukru argued that this step illustrated the adoption of a new initiative aimed at protecting and promoting Kurdish interests first and foremost. Though both the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia rejected any



attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran by aiding the KDPI, some analysts maintained that the Iraqi KDP, headed by Masoud Barzani, uses the KDPI as a bargaining tool to press the Islamic Republic in special circumstances. This assertion maintains that the party is pitted against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani. In fact, this realization ostensibly materialized after the declaration of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and various reactions to unverified declarations that claimed the Barzani group intended to reunify with Jalal Talabani's PUK and even the Goran Movement. These tensions arose because Tehran intended to punish Barzani for his ambitions, although concrete evidence was provided to confirm putative Iranian plans.

The more rational explanation of KDPI's recent actions probably has to do with the group's interests in building alliances within Iran and with neighboring states in the Middle East, as well as with the wider international community. Indeed, the KDPI an-

nounced on Twitter in July 2016 that it was meeting with representatives from the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), an umbrella organization founded by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) to bring together groups dedicated to putting PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's ideas of "democratic confederalism" into practice. The purpose of the meeting was to strengthen inter-Kurdish cooperation irrespective of political affiliations, a longstanding objective of the party .

Equally important, and because the Islamic Republic may well have infiltrated the ranks of the KDPI so completely that they would quickly know of any KDPI activities—especially those involving armed struggle against the regime—it was not farfetched to imagine that the latest clashes were devised and implemented by the IRGC. Kurdish officials maintained that the July 2016 attacks were part of a plan by IRGC spies to weaken and destabilize Iranian Kurdistan, in order to best serve the regime's political and economic interests.

The Effect of the Clashes on Kurds in Iran

When the 2003 ceasefire went into effect, most Iranian Kurds supported it: they were tired of war, ready for rest, and hoping for peace. Yet, after a few years, people concluded that the regime in Tehran not only failed to bring peace but, on the contrary, added to their misery by adding new woes, including widespread discrimination as well as economic favoritism and rampant unemployment. Many returned to their previous conviction that the Islamic government was incapable of reforms and affirmed that when ethnic or religious rights are ignored or suppressed by the majority, people will turn to violence. Few perceived the 2003 creation of the PJAK and subsequent military activities as

aberrations, and fewer were surprised when the party quickly attracted a substantial following. Since the PJAK was the only Kurdish party to engage in anti-state violence, it became popular with younger, disaffected Kurds.

Interestingly, Iranian Kurds' opinions on the recent clashes between the KDPI and the IRGC differed on several points. While some were in favor of violence, others were against it. Still others preferred neutrality. Hemen Seyedi, a political analyst and a former member of the KDPI, wrote:

Although I have some serious criticisms of the KDPI, I am in favor of this action

against the government, since for about 20 years KDPI has been completely silent and the situation of the Kurdish people has not improved. [add source as footnote]

For his part, Kamran Matin, an assistant professor and senior lecturer in international relations at Essex University, considered the KDPI claims that it no longer needed to sacrifice Iranian Kurdish interests to ensure the security of Iraqi Kurdistan's regional government worthwhile. Indeed, even the KDPI leadership felt that more active involvement inside Iranian Kurdistan was overdue, even if Matin avowed that it was important to note that the KDPI did not claim to have initiated a new round of armed struggle but instead asserted that it was acting in self-defense. Then again, the mere military presence of an armed group inside Iranian territory increased the likelihood of an attack by Iranian security forces, which came as no surprise.

Saman Rasoulpour, a Stockholm-based journalist, insisted that the KDPI's leadership believed that confrontation with Iranian forces might win the group new supporters among Iran's estimated 12 million Kurds—who have long complained of discrimination, repression, and political underrepresentation—although Rasoulpour maintained that the leaders of the party also believed that the military activities, which they interpreted as defensive action against Iranian forces, were in fact a sign of the party's dynamism, one which could strengthen and grow

its base. Rasoulpour added that in the eyes of the KDPI, armed struggle was a sign of activity and vitality and a testament to the party's ability to challenge the Iranian establishment, both of which allowed it to affirm its presence within the Islamic State.

Still others argued that the KDPI's recent activities represented an attempt to compete with the PJAK's influence, especially among young people. Mamand Roja, a Kurdish researcher and analyst, explained that the KDPI's new movements were inspired by its rivalry with groups like the PJAK. Roja added that the group also sought to energize its base and draw international attention to its cause by stepping up its fight against Iran. In recent years, the PJAK has clashed with Iranian forces on a number of occasions, trying to establish itself as the only Kurdish party willing to challenge the military. Now, the KDPI wanted to regain its traditionally dominant position within the Iranian Kurdish scene. Notwithstanding these objectives, its recent internal schisms, along with the strong interparty competition, made it unclear whether the KDPI was capable of regaining its former strength. Conversely, some Kurdish activists loyal to the Islamic Republic, such as Ehsan Hushmand, opposed these and similar clashes with authorities. They argued that violence caused instability and insecurity in Kurdistan and that the central government in Tehran would withhold future investments in the area if armed conflict gained momentum.

The Effect of Recent Clashes on the IRGC

If the warnings and harsh statements by some IRGC commanders were indicative of latent perceptions of Kurds, the recent clashes left a noticeable impact on the Iranian government and its security forces.

In fact, IRGC commanders issued several statements warning that they have been fighting terrorists with ties to “counterrevolutionary groups.” The IRGC further cautioned that its forces were care-



fully monitoring all movements along the border region and would not allow the peace and security of the people to be disrupted by any armed opposition. Recently, the commander of the IRGC ground forces, Mohammad Pakpour, even warned that the Islamic Republic could launch raids on KDPI positions inside Iraqi Kurdistan in retaliation or as a pre-emptive action. Pakpour added that since the KDPI was based in northern Iraq, any reluctance to act on its oft-declared commitments not to engage in anti-security measures would indicate that its bases would be targeted even across national borders. Hossein Salami, the IRGC second-in-command, vowed in a speech at Friday prayers at Tehran University that he would crush Kurdish rebels on either side

of the border. He warned government officials of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq to adhere to their commitments, reiterating that the Islamic Republic would suppress threats regardless of geographical considerations.

In a recent interview with Channel One, a state-sponsored Iranian TV station, Mohsen Rezaee, the secretary-general of the Islamic Republic's Expediency Discernment Council, harshly warned the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government about recent KDPI clashes. Some officials of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, including Nazem Dabaq, its representative in Iran, replied vaguely and meekly to the IRGC commanders' threats. In the days since the IRGC publicized its threats, no uptick in KDPI activity was recorded.

Is the KDPI a real or imagined threat to the Islamic Republic?

Despite claims by KDPI leaders about the group's strength and support among Iranian Kurds, analysts generally agree it does not possess the capability to pose a serious military threat to Iran. Kamran Matin believes that the KDPI does not have the level of force necessary to conquer and hold territory, nor to inflict massive casualties on the Islamic Republic's armed forces, simply due to the small size of the overall Kurdish population in Iran. Kurdish parties have launched more ambitious armed campaigns in the past without achieving any real results, and have remained militarily dormant during the past two decades. On a resource and training level, they are simply not ready to mount a major challenge to the

Iranian state. Matin further maintains that if the violence in Iranian Kurdistan continues and Tehran acts on its pledge to attack KDPI bases inside Iraq, it could create international tensions, though it remains to be seen how Iraq, the United States, and countries such as Turkey will react to larger Iranian government action in Iraq in general, and against the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government in particular. He argues that the clashes are not likely to affect Tehran's involvement in other parts of the world such as Syria, but speculates that Iraqi Kurdish parties, due to their strategic dependence on Iran, are unlikely to allow the KDPI to continue its operations against the Islamic Republic for any extended period of time.

Relationship between the Recent Executions of Kurdish Religious Activities with the Recent KDPI Clashes

After IRGC troops executed about 30 Kurdish religious activists, allegedly because they were Salafis, Iranian political activists like Saed Madanifar, Saed Razavieh Faqih and one of their lawyers, Osman Mozayyen, condemned the killings and declared them both illegal and shameful. Of course, the act was condemned by many countries and political parties, as well as legal institutes all around the world. Unfortunately, renowned Iranians like former president Muhammad Khatami, Mehdi Karroubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi, presidential candidates who lived under house arrest because they opposed the regime, all remained silent. Leading political activists asserted that the most significant objective of the Islamic regime behind these executions was to intimidate people, along with all of the political and religious activists in Iran in general,

and Kurdish and Sunnis in particular. Moreover, Tehran may well have reasoned that sending such a message to the KDPI and other political parties—that if they continued their actions they could expect violent responses—fulfilled the goal of neutralizing potential actions. This explanation may indeed be valid, because the regime chose Kurdish Religious activists and not, for example, Baluch or Arab religious activists.

It seems that the Islamic Regime has intentionally chosen both the time of execution and the singling out of Kurdish religious activists to send messages to all Kurdish political parties not to continue their clashes and to warn one and all that if they do, then they ought to anticipate harsh responses. A similar message may well have been telegraphed to the regime's Sunni foes.

Conclusion

Recent KDPI armed activities, and the reactions they elicited from both the Islamic Republic regime and observers and analysts, bring with them a new set of circumstances for KDPI combatants, followers, and members to consider. The armed movement, however, was easily suppressed due to the party's financial and military constraints as well as the shadow of the relationship between Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government and Tehran. Nevertheless, the IRGC's harsh and public reaction to the clashes indicated their impact on the Kurdish people and

the threat it represented to the Islamic regime. Tehran faced other anti-regime movements in other regions, such as in Baluchistan, but the Kurdish uprisings were considered especially threatening because of the long history of discord between the Islamic Republic and its Kurdish populations ever since the 1979 Revolution, as well as the decades-long international plight of the Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.

While the KDPI as well as most of the other Kurdish parties, including Kamalah, the



KDP , and smaller parties like the Kurdistan Independence Party (PSK) and Free Party of Kurdistan (PAK), were all dwarfed by the PJAK in terms of membership and strategic ability, it is important to note that the recent clashes within Iran introduced significant dilemmas. LDPI adherents were mostly centered in Western Azerbaijan (Iran) and the Kurdish provinces of Iran, not in other Kurdish-inhabited areas such as Kermanshah, Ilam, Lurestan, and West Khorasan. PJAK activists, in contrast, retained a higher profile inside

Iran and cultivated followings in all areas with Kurdish populations. Under the circumstances, it was necessary for the KDPI and other Kurdish parties to revise their strategies, and look for constituents in other Kurdish areas of Iran too. Lastly, it was vital for all Kurdish parties, including the PJAK, to avoid repeating the same historical errors that allowed outsiders to benefit from internal divisions. Kurdish unity against their common foe, the Iranian government, stood as the only meaningful path on the quest for freedom.

Endnotes

- (1) For a thorough recent assessment of the events that rocked Iran in 1953, see Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations*, New York and London: The New Press, 2013.
- (2) "KDPI Clash with Iran Revolutionary Guards in Mahabad," *Rudaw*, 25 June 2016, at <http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/250620161>

References

- Ward, Steven R. 2009. *Immortal: A Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Natali, Denise. 2005. *The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, And Iran*: Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Nourizadeh, Ali-Reza. "The Tragedy of Being Kurd in Iran." April 27, 2004. <http://www.nourizadeh.com/archives/000267.php>
- Valli, Abbas. 2011. *Kurds and the State in Iran: The Making of Kurdish Identity*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
- Rubin, Michael. 2003. "Are Kurds a Pariah Minority?" *Social Research* 70 (1): 295-330.

Masarat



King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS)

Founded in 1983 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and chaired by HRH Prince Turki Al-Faisal bin Abdulaziz, the mission of The King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies is to be a beacon of knowledge for humanity as envisioned by the late King Faisal bin Abdulaziz. The Center aims to accomplish this through conducting research and studies that stimulate cultural and scientific activities in the service of mankind, enriching cultural and intellectual life in Saudi Arabia, and facilitating collaboration between the East and the West.

The Center's activities include lectures, seminars, conferences, and roundtable discussions. It houses the King Faisal Library, a collection of rare manuscripts, an Islamic art museum, and the King Faisal Museum. It also administers a robust Visiting Fellowship Program. Since the Center's focus is scholarly research, the Research Department was restructured in 2013 to carry out in-depth analysis in contemporary political thought, Saudi studies, regional studies, Arabic language studies, and modernity studies. The Center has also been collaborating with various research centers around the world within its scope of research.



مركز الملك فيصل للبحوث والدراسات الإسلامية
King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies

P.O.Box 51049 Riyadh 11543 **Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

Tel: (+966 11) 4652255 Ext: 6892 Fax: (+966 11) 4162281

E-mail: masarat@kfcris.com