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Jihadist and Salafi Discourses in Sudanic Africa: Boko Haram and the Emerging Terror Network in Muslim West Africa

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***“The Qur’an teaches that we must shun
democracy, we must shun the constitution,
[and] we must shun Western education”***

*Abubaker Shekau-BH leader
(Agbibo 2015).*

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Abstract

From the Almoravid's invasion of Ghana in 1062 until the Moroccan conquest of the Songhay Empire in 1591 that, allegedly, was not "sufficiently Muslim," Africa south of the Sahara has been exposed to a "purification of Islam" project. This project took two forms, one was the quietist, intellectually driven reformism (for instance, the 15th century Moroccan al- Maghili and 16th century Malian Ahmad Baba al-Timbukti d. 1627). The second was militant Islamism, for which the 19th century, better known as the "Jihadist period," was particularly significant in Sudanic Africa. Maba Diakhou Ba (1809-1867) was active in the Senegambia, 'Umar Tall (1795-1864) in Central Mali, and 'Usman dan Fodio (1754-1817) in mainland Central Sudan (Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroun). Since the second half of the 20th century when the *shari'a* [Islamic Law] was the rule in 'Usman dan Fodio's Sokoto Caliphate (1804-1903), the development became a reference point for Jihadist ideologues in Nigeria. The 1979 Iranian Revolution further served as an impetus for political activism and reformist tendencies in Muslim West Africa, ranging from the moderate to the extremist, even before the September 11, 2001 cataclysm in the U.S. The Yan Izala, a pan-Wahhabi literalist, reformist movement to which Abū Bakr Gumi (1924-1992) served as the patron saint, the *spirit auctores*, provided a platform for both the quietist intellectual Salafī protagonists of Nigeria on the one hand, and the Jihadi Salafi interlocutors on the other. The most illustrious exponent of the latter category is Boko Haram.

This paper gives an overview of the history of Salafi and Jihadist narratives in Sudanic Africa with particular attention to Boko Haram of Nigeria, as it now assumes a wider regional profile in Muslim West Africa.

Introduction

Boko Haram is the pejorative term for an organization that normally refers to itself as *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna li-l Da'wa wa-l-Jihad 'ala Minhaj al-Salaf* (Assembly of the People of the Sunna for Propagation and Armed Struggle according to Salafi methods). However, the mainstream Muslim ecumene, and indeed the discursive traditions in contemporary politics and spiritualism refer to it as Boko Haram, which literally translates as “alien [Western] culture is forbidden.”¹ Adherents accept the group’s explicit and doctrinal aversion to all forms of Western values, including its educational system. In fact, the movement began as a recluse entity whose chief objective was to establish pristine Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxy, first in Maiduguri (in Northeastern Nigeria), and later from its “exile” settlement (*mahjar*) in distant Kanamma around 2002.² Its “socio-revolutionary activism” intermittently brought it into conflict with the state security apparatus, which reached a peak with the extra-judicial murder of its charismatic leader Muhammad Yusuf in 2009. By all accounts, this singular event forced the movement to go underground and embrace “violent sectarianism.”³

Boko Haram’s discourse and the behavior of its adherents have, ever since, developed into an exclusivist form of Jihadism that is increasingly disconnected from, and hostile to, various forms of Salafism. Its hallmark, which has since attracted the attention of the entire world, includes the killing of innocent civilians (Muslims and non-Muslims alike), the abduction of children, kidnappings galore, the deployment of teenage suicide bombers

(1) The term ecumene (U.S.) which may be literally translated as “inhabited,” is an ancient Greek word for the known world, or the inhabited world. Under the Roman Empire, it came to refer to civilization and, more recently, to mean secular and religious imperial administrations.

(2) In the context of religious studies orthopraxy means “correct practice,” both at the ethical and liturgical levels. On the other hand, Orthodoxy emphasizes faith and correct belief.

(3) Thurston, Alexander. “Nigeria’s Mainstream Salafis between Boko Haram and the State,” *Islamic Africa* 6 (2015), pp. 109-134. See also Pham, J. Peter. “How Boko Haram Became the Islamic State’s West Africa Province,” *Journal of International Security Affairs* 36:30, 2016, pp. 17-26; Smith, J. Mike. *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War*, London: Hurst, 2016; and Andrew Walker, “*Eat the Heart of the Infidel: The Harrowing of Nigeria and the Rise of Boko Haram* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2016).

in public spaces, as well as the destruction of public and private property, including schools, places of worship and security posts. These developments have created enormous trans-national human and security problems, ranging the gamut from encouraging internal displacement to tragic trans-border refugee crises. A recent report by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) indicates that some 100,000 people were driven by the Boko Haram insurgency from their homes in Niger’s southeast Diffa region, and from numerous Nigerian villages, leading at least 170 communities to be completely deserted. An additional 2.2 million individuals were internally displacement in the states of Adamawa, Yobe, and Borno.⁴

What follows is an evaluation of the alleged religious “renewal” in Sudanic Africa. The goal is to better assess the long-term implications of the Boko Haram phenomenon on regional peace and security, precisely to shed light on short-and medium-term developments across the region. How has the Boko Haram phenomenon redefined the narratives on ethical, political, and militant revivalism/Salafism in Sudanic Africa? What was and is the evolving context of terrorist networks across the Sahel and the West African sub region?

Shari'a States of Nigeria



Courtesy: Agbiboa 2015

(4) Dobbs, Leo. “Thousands newly displaced by Boko Haram in Niger,” *News Stories*, Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, January 19, 2016, at <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/1/569e32389/thousands-newly-displaced-boko-haram-niger.html>.

At the Root of Jihadism in Sudanic Africa

A familiar method to narrate contemporary political, academic and public discourse is to compartmentalize the Muslim World into two delineated parts or visions; that of “rabid fundamentalists,” which is another term often used to identify Jihadi Salafists, and “enlightened liberals,” mystics that are sometimes referred to as new intellectuals.⁵ These terminologies include Africa as a continent, which a large Muslim population calls home, with deep roots in early Islamic history. In fact, the trans-Saharan trade referred to by numerous scholars as a key link between the Arabian Peninsula and Sudanic Africa, preceded the proclamation of Islam in Arabia in the 7th century. Ethiopia, then known as Abyssinia, is widely credited for offering asylum to Muslims as early as 615 CE when many adherents were persecuted elsewhere. Therefore, it became the first location on the African Continent to be in direct contact with Muslims. In that capacity, Ethiopia connected Africa with the Middle East, which facilitated later interactions and associations.

Over the years, various thinkers referred to these links, underscoring their value. For example, Imam al-Shafi‘i (d. 820), alluded to the ancient West African kingdom of Tigrur [Tekroul] as a land of gold. Additionally, Muslim geographers from the 10th century, like al-Mas‘udi and al-Bakri, added their voices praising the African welcome mat. Later explorers, including Ibn Battuta (d. 1368) and the 16th century Moroccan traveler, al-Hasan b. Muhammad al-Wazzan, better known as Leo Africanus (d. 1554), made frequent references about the places they visited in their valuable travelogues. Beyond these positive contacts, however, various Muslim military campaigns that spanned the 11th to 17th centuries, left undeniable scars too. Violent Almoravid engagements in 1062 plundered

(5) Corbett, R. Rosemary. “Islamic ‘Fundamentalism’: The Mission Creep of an American Religious Metaphor,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 83:4 (December 2015), pp. 911-1004, available online at <http://irpl.org/wp-main/uploads/Corbett.pdf>.

Ghana, for example, while Moroccan troops conquered Songhay in 1591.⁶ In-between these tension-filled periods, other Islamic states arose across Sudanic African lands, ranging from the Empire of Ghana in the 10th century to those of Mali (1215-1450) and Songhay (1430s-1591). Of course, there was a brief interregnum when the Sufi-oriented Almohades (1121-1269), which dislodged the Almoravids from North and West Africa, prevailed and that probably represented the earliest introduction to a sustained Sufi current in Sudanic Africa.⁷ Farther afield in the Horn was an Islamic Sultanate in Bale, Ethiopia as early as the 13th century, while the Islamic Kingdom of Bornu lasted from the 11th century to the 14th. A successor state, the Bornu Empire, gained strength after 1380 and prospered until 1893 in territories that included today's northeastern Nigeria and parts of the Chad, Niger and the Cameroon. Al-Sa'di, the famed Timbuktu historian, acknowledged in 1655 the grandeur that was Bornu at its zenith at a time when Malian glory—as the signpost of Islamic cultural and political icon—was gradually vanishing. In al-Sa'di's own words: “We have heard it said [...] that there are four sultans in the world [apart from the sultan in Constantinople]—in Baghdad, Cairo, Bornu and Mali.”⁸

(6) The Almoravid [*al-Murābiṭīn* in Arabic], which was a Berber imperial dynasty that inhabited a wide region in what is today Morocco, ruled over a vast area, stretching all the way to the Andulus, or modern Spain. From their Marrakesh stronghold, the Almoravids conquered numerous tribes throughout the Sahara, stretching to Niger and the Senegal. See Messier, A. Ronald *Almoravids and the Meanings of Jihad* (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2010). The Songhay Empire, which rose in the Western Sahel between the 15th and 16th centuries, was headquartered in Gao—today in Mali—while an earlier Songhay state existed as early as the 11th century. Other important cities in the empire were Timbuktu and Djenne, conquered respectively in 1468 and 1475, where urban-centered trade flourished. Internecine fighting weakened Songhay leaders, which led to a decline, until Ahmad al-Mansur, the Moroccan Sultan, took advantage of the civil strife in the empire and sent an army to gain control of most Trans-Saharan trade routes. For additional details, see Levtzion, Nehemia ed., *Islam in West Africa: Religion, Society and Politics to 1800* (Abington, U.K.: Routledge, 2017).

(7) The Almohad Caliphate (known in Arabic as the *Muwahhidun* or the unifiers) was another Moroccan Berber movement founded in the 12th century. See Reinhart, Dozy *History of the Almohades*, 2nd ed., (Leiden: Brill, 1881).

(8) Kati (al-), Mamud. *Tarikh es-Soudan*, translated and edited by Octave V. Houdas and Maurice Delafosse (Paris: Adrien Maissonneuve, 1964), as quoted in Dorrit van Dalen, “There is no doubt: Muslim Scholarship and Society in 17th-Century Central Sudanic Africa,” (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Leiden, Netherlands, 2015), 25.

Bornu was particularly significant, not only for representing the oldest signpost of Islamic intellectual life in Sudanic Africa, but also for being a sparring partner in the “Reformism” and “Counter-Reformism” movements of the 19th centuries. Indeed, differences of opinion between its intellectuals and those in the Sokoto Caliphate, which flourished under ‘Usman dan Fodio, stood as a paradigm of solid academic exchanges that preoccupied everyone concerned. In actual terms, the 19th century, rightly called the “Jihadist Period,” actually was the era of indigenous revivalism and reformist projects throughout Sudanic Africa.⁹ Intellectual and military engagements that aimed to restore “protean Islam” in the context of a “deculturation” enterprise, that is, stripping Islamic practices of their local contents, marked this period too. What prevailed were efforts aimed at freeing Islam from all vestiges of native, heathen, or syncretic practices, in favor of institutionalizing the rule of the Prophetic traditions, as developed in the Sunna/Shari‘a, all to dismember all forms of *bid‘a* (unorthodox innovation). The intellectuals who embarked on these initiatives and who left their marks included, Maba Diakhou Ba (1809-1867), who was active in the Senegambia, ‘Umar Tall (1795-1864) in Central Mali, and ‘Usman Dan Fodio (1754-1817) in mainland Central Sudan (Nigeria, Niger, Cameroun). ‘Usman Dan Fodio encapsulated the thought and practice of intellectual and Jihadi revivalism of the times (*al-Jihad bi-l-qalam wa-l-sayf*) in his magnum opus, *Ihya’ al-Sunna wa Ikhdad al-Bid‘a* (Reviving the Sunna and Extinguishing the *Bid‘a*). This was exactly what later neo-Salafi ideologues—and of course pretenders—would appropriate and adopt as a reference point in Central Sudan, specifically in Nigeria, as the Sokoto Caliphate (1804-1903) ended.

Sudanic Africa in the Discourse on Salafism

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001, several major violent events occurred across the Sudanic African states, including a campaign of terror in Somalia, perpetrated by al-Shabab, one of the most

(9) Charlotte A. Quinn and Frederick Quinn, *Pride, Faith and Fear: Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

ferocious contemporary groups to emerge on the international scene. On September 1, 2015, for example, al-Shabab launched an attack on the African Union Mission in Janaale, Somalia, which killed several dozen Ugandan soldiers.¹⁰ Similarly, Seleka rebels calling for the establishment of a new country as a radical solution to the worsening sectarian conflict in the Central African Republic, butchered scores.¹¹ In Nigeria, especially after 2002, the Boko Haram insurgency and self-immolation adventurism took off in earnest, while the 2012 Mali insurrection gained momentum. All of these uprisings and acts of violence were made in the name of Salafism. This reinforced an unfavorable Western stereotypical depiction of revivalist Islam as one of unrelenting militancy and gratuitous cultural vandalism, which further pushed the benign form to the fringes, if not to the waste bin.

Nonetheless, contemporary representations of Salafism as a renewed “face of Islam,” often draw on a number of concordant and/or jarring textual canons from authorities across the Muslim World. Even the Western typology of “moderate/liberal Islam,” something that falls between “Salafism” and “modernity,” and even then, it is far less comprehensive. According to a leading authority on the subject, several factors and developments have, at least since the late twentieth century, led to a new perception of what it really means to be a Salafist, or one who can be so characterized in light of nascent nationalist tendencies. Interestingly, there is now a brand new phenomenon, that of a triumphant ideologization of “Purist Salafism,” which can no longer be overlooked either.¹² Regrettably, however, Africa south of the Sahara is

(10) “Somalia–Terrorist Attack Against an African Union Mission Base,” September 1, 2015, Paris: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, at <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/somalia/events/article/somalia-terrorist-attack-against-an-african-union-mission-base-september-1-2015>. See also Agence France-Presse, “Al-Shabaab Kills Dozens of African Union Troops at Base in Somalia,” *The Guardian*, June 26, 2015, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/26/al-shabaab-attacks-african-union-base-somalia-scores-killed>.

(11) Smith, David “Central African Republic’s Seleka Rebels Call for Secession Amid Sectarian War,” *The Guardian*, April 25, 2014, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/25/central-african-republic-muslim-seleka-rebels-demand-secession-sectarianism>.

(12) Lauziere, Henri. *The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).

all but ignored in this new typology, best illustrated by its absence in Roel Meijer's 2009 classic study on global Salafism. Still, a recent edition of *Islamic Africa* wholly dedicated to Salafism in Sudanic Africa has become a major, if not the major, empirical and theoretical exposition on Salafi movements throughout the continent, offering various assessments of traditional and/or peculiar forms the initiatives evolved into. For one scholar, this has been characterized as "African Salafism," which signifies that the representation of Salafism on the African continent may well be shaped by local will and ethos.¹³ Notwithstanding its acknowledged analytical value, this characterization overlooks, or gracefully sidesteps, the benign form of Salafism in the sense of welfarism, volunteerism, and individualistic/communal ethical renewal. Characteristics that were conveniently addressed by Muhammad Abu Rumman's "Third Way" paradigm, and which were further developed by Adis Duderija, Dorothea Schulz, Chanfi Ahmad, and Amidu Sanni.¹⁴

Before the Boko Haram: The Antecedents

Ever since the early 1960s, Wahhabi tendencies, which are underlined by the commitment to return to scriptural and literalist Islam, evolved in Sudanic Africa. Saudi-nurtured African graduate trainees and, to a lesser extent, the products of other Arab Salafi centers who could be identified as "new intellectuals," were psychologically and cerebrally conditioned to oppose Sufism, folk values and

(13) Østebø, Terje. "African Salafism: Religious Purity and the Politicization of Purity," *Islamic Africa* 6:1-2 (2015), pp. 1-29

(14) Abu Rumman, Mohammad. *I am a Salafi: A Study of the Actual and Imagined Identities of the Salafis* (Amman, Jordan: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014). See also Ahmed, Chanfi. *West African 'Ulama' and Salafism in Mecca and Medina: Jawab al-Ifriqi—the response of the African* (Leiden: Brill, 2015); Duderija, Adis. *Constructing Religiously Ideal 'Believer' and 'Woman' in Islam: Neo-traditional Salafi and Progressive Muslims' Methods of Interpretation* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Schulz, Dorothea. "Remaking Society from Within: Extraversion and the Social Forms of Female Muslim Activism in Urban Mali," in Barbara Bompani and Maria Frahm-Arrp, eds., *Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State* (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010), 74-96; Idem. "Renewal and Enlightenment: Muslim Women's Biographic Narratives of Personal Reform in Mali," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 41:1 (2011), 93-123; and Sanni, Amidu "New Phase of Religiosity and Ethical Renewal in Sudanic Africa: a Narrative from Nigeria," Paper presented at the XXI Quinquennial Conference of the International Association for the history of Religions (IAHR), Erfurt, Germany, August 23-29, 2015.

similar practices that stood as distinctive markers of Muslim Africa. These “new intellectuals” created a new platform of “deculturation” of African Islam, that is, divesting it of indigenous imprints through a robust canonical and scriptural interaction, as well as full-fledged engagements with state political establishments at local, indigenous, religious communities. The resurgence of Sunni Islam and a demonstration of the foundational ethos of the faith was most evident on university campuses. At the Cocody campus of the University of Abidjan (Ivory Coast), for example, students recruited followers, including young, educated women, some of whom were expelled from the university for refusing to remove their veils for identification purposes before they took their examinations.¹⁵ In the event, “family resemblances” flourished in all forms of Salafism, which were and are found across the Sudanic African states and communities. Yet, the underlining denominator remained an emphasis on personal piety and correct behavior, in short, the *sunnatization* of public and private lives.

The Outset of Jihadi Salafism

Riding on the popularity of ‘Usman dan Fodio’s historic reformist initiatives, Shaykh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi (1924-1992) set the stage for a new religious discourse in Nigeria, with the establishment of his *Jama‘at Izalat al-Bid‘a wa Iqamat al-Sunna* (The Community for the Removal of Innovation and the Establishment of Sunna).¹⁶ Gumi’s *Jama‘at* focused on what he labeled *takfiri*

(15) Miran-Guyon, Marie. “The Political Economy of Civil Islam in Côte d’Ivoire,” in *Politischer Islam in Westafrika: Eine Bestandaufnahme* (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung-Lit Verlag, 2006), 82- 113.

(16) Kane, Ousmane. *Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A Study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition* (Leiden: Brill, 2003). See also Loimeier, Roman. *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria* (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1997); Idem., *Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013); and Ben Amara, Ramzi. “The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis, and Perception of Shari’a Implementation,” (PhD Dissertation, Bayreuth, Germany: Bayreuth University, 2011). The Izala replaced the *Jama‘at* in 1978 and became one of the largest Islamic societies in Nigeria, Chad, Niger and the Cameroon. Established by Shaykh Isma‘ila Idris (1937-2000), “in reaction to the Sufi brotherhoods,” the Izala actively propagated the faith, especially in the field of education, as the society erected schools throughout the countries where they gained influence. Ironically, and as discussed below, the Boko Haram group labeled Izala members as infidels allegedly because of their willingness to work with the Nigerian government. See Commins, David. *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 152-55.

behavior by Sufi acolytes and the latter's semiotics and rituals that, apparently, were deemed unacceptable. The Jama'at sought and may have earned the support of Wahhabi Salafism, though this created a monumental schism among Nigerian Muslims after the mid-1970s. What ensued was not entirely surprising as Jama'at activities provided the platforms that served as the launching pads for the three forms of Salafi movements identifiable in the Nigerian religious cosmos: (1) the intellectually driven theo-political, or government-ruled, Salafis, whom Alexander Thurston called "mainstream Salafis;"¹⁷ (2) the breakaway proto-Izalaists, with more accommodating attitudes towards Sufism and Sufi fraternities; and the proto-Jihadi groups whose hallmarks evolved into violence and whose objectives hovered around separatist activities.¹⁸ The only common denominator shared by each was adherence to the Sunna of the Prophet, whatever that meant in their interpretations and visions. However, the difference in emphasis was, simultaneously, one of degree and even of type. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that there was no lack of insurgent outbursts that did not trace their roots in the Izala establishment. For instance, the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution—which inspired a new political activism across West Africa particularly among young people and local clerics disenchanted with anti-Sufi and pro-Wahhabi oriented Salafism—as well as the Maitatsine cataclysm of 1980, among other developments, mobilized many.¹⁹ Likewise,

(17) Thurston, Alexander. "Nigeria's Mainstream Salafis between Boko Haram and the State," *Islamic Africa* 6:1-2 (2015), 109-34.

(18) See also Azumah, John. "Boko Haram in Retrospect," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 26:1 (2015), 33-52.

(19) The Maitatsine cataclysm is named after the contentious Nigerian preacher Muhammad Marwa, who died in 1980, and who was best known by his nickname Maitatsine (and less commonly, as *AllahTatsine*). *Maitatsine* is a Hausa word meaning "the one who damns" and refers to his curse-laden public speeches against Nigerian authorities. Amazingly, Maitatsine claimed to be a prophet and saw himself as a successor of Shaykh 'Usman dan Fodio, rejected the Hadith and the Sunna of the Prophet. For him, reading anything other than the Scriptures was akin to paganism and, like other extremists, he called on his followers to shun the use of radios, watches, bicycles, cars and the possession of more money than necessary for subsistence. In 1979, he even rejected the prophethood of the messenger and portrayed himself as a *Nabi* (Prophet). Authorities arrested him on several occasions for slander though he was protected by the religious establishment. By December 1980, continued attacks on other religious figures and police led to clashes with the Nigerian army which resulted in an estimated 5,000 killed, including Maitatsine himself. For details, see, Isichei, Elizabeth. "The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A Revolt of the Disinherited," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 17:3 (October 1987), 194-208.

the Ikhwan of Ibrahim Elzaky (b. 1963) of Northern Nigeria attracted a steady membership of followers from outside the universities. In this instance, and beyond initial recruitment and induction activities, the Elzaky Ikhwan recruited from amongst a much larger segment of society, particularly in Northwestern Nigeria from its Zaria—one of the largest cities in Kaduna State—headquarters. Although the movement’s declared mission was to transmit what it believed to be the true teachings of Islam according to the shari‘a, its anti-establishment rhetoric—which drew inspiration from Iranian revolutionary Islamism—led to repeated confrontations with the state security apparatus, the latest occurring between December 12 and 15, 2015.²⁰ What all of these movements and groups confirmed was the existence of a plethora of tributaries from which the different genres of Salafism, as indicated in the Izala narrative, could draw.²¹

Boko Haram Founder: Muhammad Yusuf (1970-2009)



Photo Credit: BBC 2015

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- (20) Due to the bloody clashes, several acolytes and disciples of Elzaky were reportedly killed by the military. See Abubakar, Aminu. “Shia in Nigeria: Deliberate Violence or Mistaken Intent?,” (London: Centre for Religion and Geopolitics, January 21, 2016), available at <http://www.religionandgeopolitics.org/nigeria/shia-nigeria-deliberate-violence-or-mistaken-intent>.
- (21) Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29:3 (2006), 207–39.

The Boko Haram: A Precursor

The discursive tradition on Boko Haram, like the phenomenon itself, is best described as a “moving cluster/an image unlimited.” The decisive routing of the Maitatsine revolt in Kano (Northwestern Nigeria) in 1980 forced the remnants of all that was left to other parts of northern Nigeria. This was especially the case for the Northeast, and across the Nigerian border states of Cameroun, Chad, and Niger, into a new cluster.²² For one observer, this phenomenon highlighted how insecurity in much of northern Nigeria, and not necessarily a “new war” between ethno-religious groups *per se*, gained influence as a result of poor governance and development deficits. In fact, violence or the resort to violent acts, gained ground as the masses stayed trapped in affliction while a handful of governing elites lived in affluence. The Jama‘at Ahl al-Sunna li-l Da‘wa tapped on such grievances and gained in popularity. It was not long before the Jama‘at became better known by their *nom de guerre*, Boko Haram (Western Culture is Forbidden), even if this was not the first group that resorted to violence to reach its objectives.

In the late 1990s, for example, Mali witnessed the phenomenon of the “bare footers” (*Pieds Nus*), composed of Muslim faithful who, apart from not wearing shoes, rejected every contact with Western products. Their remarkable parallel to the Boko Haram movement was evident, Although the Boko Haram process/project galvanized a significant segment of the population starting early 1995. Similarly, the Boko Haram narrative drew on the historical and traditional rivalries between the Kanuri-Bornu Empire and the Hausa-Fulani Sokoto caliphate from the 19th century—which remained unexplored or at least poorly explored—enmities that intermittently played out in the politics and religious discourse of independent Nigeria. Kanuri politics often endeavored to be self-assertive of identity against the overbearing Hausa-Fulani element in

(22) Aghedo, Iro. “Old Wine in a New Bottle: Ideological and Operational Linkages between Maitatsine and Boko Haram Revolts in Nigeria,” *African Security* 7:4 (October 2014), 229-50, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280309944_Old_Wine_in_a_New_Bottle_Ideological_and_Operational_Linkages_Between_Maitatsine_and_Boko_Haram_Revolts_in_Nigeria..

the Nigerian system that was certainly worthy of careful investigation. It may be possible to classify the evolution and development of Boko Haram in three specific time frames, as follows:

1. Evolution (1995-2005). With the Sahaba group in 1995 under Abubakar Lawal, a mentor and role model for Muhammad Yusuf, emerged the nucleus of what would later be Boko Haram.²³ This “new face” of the Salafi movement appeared under different names such as Ahl al-Sunna;²⁴ or as the “Taliban of Nigeria” (December 2003–2005) with a “live-off-the-land” lifestyle at Kanamma camp called “Afghanistan,” erected in a remote area of northeast Nigeria along the border with the Niger Republic. At the time, the group recruited members from among unemployed university graduates who used to ransack security posts as well as Christian enclaves in Borno State (Northeast Nigeria).²⁵ It also operated as Yusufiyah, in recognition of the eponymous Muhammad Yusuf—who was born in Girgir village in Yobe State—(29 January 1970-30 July 2009). However, it was from its ‘*mahjar*’ (migration/isolation base) that its ideological bent and (anti-)social orientations started to form into a distinctive, religious, and communal identity marker. Moreover, it was during this phase that Boko Haram and Muhammad Yusuf had close ties with mainstream Salafis, especially Shaykh Ja‘far Mahmud Adam Daura (ca. 1961/1962- 2007), a mentor and model for Yusuf. Patronage by the state political establishment, particularly in Borno State, was not in short supply during this period. This was especially the case from 2002 onward, when Boko Haram was a

(23) Manuel Reinert and Lou Garçon, “Boko Haram: A Chronology,” in Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, ed., *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*, Leiden: African Studies Centre [in association with the French Institute for Research in Africa, University of Ibadan and the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria 2014], 237- 45.

(24) Thurston, Alex. “Nigeria’s AhlusSunna: A Preaching Network from Kano to Medina and Back,” in Masooda Bano and Keiko Sakurai, eds., *Shaping Global Islamic Discourses: The Role of al-Azhar, al-Medina, and al-Mustafa* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 93-116.

(25) Egieegba Agbiboa, Daniel. “The Social Dynamics of the ‘Nigerian Taliban’: fresh insights from the social identity theory,” *Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies* 41:3 (2015), 415-37. See also, Mellgard, Emily. “What is Boko Haram?,” London: Centre for Religion and Geopolitics, September 16, 2016, available at <http://www.religionandgeopolitics.org/boko-haram/what-boko-haram..>

useful “free range bird” that could be manipulated. Its basic attraction for youth and those in society who were financially and socially meant that the movement assumed education, social welfare services and economic empowerment instead of the government. Movement leaders provided these services and more, including affordable marriage arrangements and sustained feeding schemes which further enhanced its growing influence.

2. Gestation (2005-2009). The second period began with the group’s concentration on proselytism and the indoctrination of its acolytes. To ensure the advocacy for the formal establishment of an Islamic State was not explicit at this stage, though opprobrium for Western culture (and education methods), from which the “illegitimacy” of the non-shari’a compliant Nigerian state is believed to have derived, became a familiar refrain in every discourse. The entire spectrum of what Boko Haram stands for was crystallized in the “manifesto” of its spiritual quintessential founder, Muhammad Yusuf, titled *Hadhihi 'Aqidatuna*.²⁶ Emboldened by the reception his manifesto, Yusuf distributed it to dozens of his followers in Algeria and Mauritania starting in the early 2000s to “gain the strength to succeed” in jihad in Nigeria. It was also at this time that his men started their para-military training with al-Qa’ida in Morocco.²⁷
3. Etatization and Networking of Terror (2009-). The third phase started after the extra judicial killing of Yusuf, along with several of his supporters, on July 30, 2009. This was the “catalyst event” that ignited in the Boko Haram household the “psychology of vengeance” against perceived state atrocities, which had been perpetrated against it over the years but that reached an apex with Yusuf’s assassination. Surviving movement leaders were thus forced to re-strategize, a task entrusted to Abubakar Shekau, who emerged as the Boko Haram *de facto* leader. It was also at this stage that the

(26) Yusuf, Muhammad. *Hadhihi 'Aqidatuna wa Manhaj Da'watina* (Maiduguri, Nigeria: n. p., 2009).

(27) Zenn, Jacob. “Nigerian al-Qaedaism,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*,” Volume 16 (March 2014), 99-117, available at <https://hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1392/zenn.pdf>.

idea of religious purity took on a sharp political feature, as strict security measures were introduced and increasingly sophisticated weapons used. Regular clashes forced many Nigerians into flee to neighboring countries, while internal displacement of others occurred from the Northeast, which became the epicenter of the insurgency. In fact, this is now the most crucial stage with the group’s declared objective being focused: “to Islamize Nigeria and [to] ensure the rule of the majority of Muslims in the country.”²⁸ This objective had in fact been articulated by Yusuf’s *alter ego*, the native Cameroonian Muhammad (Mamman) Nūr before 2009, as the symbolism of ‘Usman dan Fodio’s Jihad became a point of reference in the group’s dialectics and discourses. In any case, Yusuf’s ideology—a hybrid of Saudi and Egyptian Ikhwan Salafism, the Taliban al-Qa‘idaism, and the Jihadism of ‘Usman dan Fodio—meant that militants would prevail. That is why the “Caliph Shekau,” by all accounts an individual endowed with limited intellectual capabilities, transformed the movement into a jihadist insurgency that continues to prevail.

Abduction of School Children



Boko Haram abducted some 270 schoolgirls from a Chibok secondary school on April 14, 2014. January 9, 2017 marked their 1,000th day in captivity.

(28) Thurston, Alexander. *Salafism in Nigeria: Islam, Preaching and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 26. In particular see 193-239.

Uprooting Western Education Symbols



Boko Haram has attacked many schools in northern Nigeria.

Courtesy BBC News May 4, 2015.

Nocturnal Raid on Locals



Boko Haram in Action.

Photo Credit: *Al-Jazeera*, August 2015

Boko Haram Targets Soft Places: Teenage Suicide Bombers on The Spree



On August 11, 2015, a male suicide bomber strikes at a cattle market in Sabongari Village, Dambuwal Local Government near Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria.

The New Boko Haram “Caliphate”

By the end of 2014, Boko Haram leaders announced the establishment of a “Caliphate” on the vast swathe of territory they captured from the Nigerian government. This is despite the fact that they also experienced significant territorial losses after authorities mounted a series of robust counter-insurgency operations. Consequently, Boko Haram engaged in urban guerrilla warfare, suicide bombings, and assorted other deadly activities that cost many lives, including those of innocent bystanders.²⁹ This particular phase marked a major turning point in the Boko Haram narrative, as its responses to local, trans-local, regional, and global counter- terrorism initiatives began to have far-reaching implications for national, continental, and world politics.³⁰ Still, the event that stood out was the abduction of some 270 school girls at a state school in Chibok, Borno State, in April 2014—their 1,000th day in captivity was marked

(29) “Boko Haram on the Back Foot?,” International Crisis Group Africa Briefing, Number 120, May 4, 2016, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/b120-boko-haram-on-the-back-foot.aspx>.

(30) Cummings, Ryan. “Boko Haram: A Regional Solution Required,” London: Centre for Religion and Geopolitics, May 1, 2015, available at <http://www.religionandgeopolitics.org/boko-haram/boko-haram-regional-solution-required>.

on January 9, 2017—which highlighted the danger that the festering Boko Haram insurgency constituted to the whole world. More than anything else, this incident mobilized many and underscored the lamentation of the former President, Goodluck Jonathan, in 2013 when he grimly admitted the presence of Boko Haram sympathizers and patron saints in the state political machinery, the judiciary, and indeed in almost every sector of the Nigerian polity.³¹

Equally daunting challenges arose in recent years that required authorities to be vigilant. On Friday August 21, 2015, Abuja sacked the head of the Nigerian Immigration Services, ostensibly because he facilitated the issuance of an entry visa to Shaykh Ahmad al-Assir, a Lebanese cleric, wanted in Beirut for acts of terrorism.³² It was unclear whether the Assir case confirmed the level of collaboration between Salafi movements and wanted men, though the mere fact that the Lebanese cleric carried a valid Nigerian visa in his forged passport did not bode well.

Of course, this was not the only such case as the Nigerian Department of State Security dislodged a Boko Haram spy network on August 29, 2015. Amazingly this spearheaded by a 14-year old at the nation's international airport in the capital city. He was discovered to be secretly monitoring and studying travel

(31) Azumah, *op. cit.*

(32) Ahmad al-Assir is a firebrand former Shaykh of the Bilal b. Rabah Mosque in Saida (Sidon), Lebanon, who was a vociferous critic of Hizballah, a pro-Iranian militia that is predominantly Shi'a. He gained notoriety after the outbreak of the uprisings in Syria, and publicly lambasted Beirut for tolerating the militia's activities—including bearing illegal arms inside the country. Al-Assir espoused Salafi norms and delivered frequent soliloquies against Iran and the Hizballah militia, which he routinely accused of being a threat to the fragile sectarian balance and democracy in Lebanon. In mid-June 2013, his men clashed with army units, and what ensued was classic urban warfare. At least ten Lebanese Army soldiers were killed and 35 wounded near the Abra complex that houses the Bilal b. Rabah Mosque during the first clashes. On June 23-24, 2013, heavy street fighting erupted between the Lebanese Army and gunmen loyal to al-Assir when an additional sixteen soldiers, thirteen al-Assir supporters and approximately four Hizballah militiamen were also killed. Army commandos seized al-Assir's complex just after he fled the premises to an unknown destination. After being a wanted fugitive for years, al-Assir was detained on Saturday August 15, 2015, by Lebanese General Security officials at the Rafiq Hariri International Airport while attempting to flee to Egypt using a forged passport. Upon his capture, it was revealed that al-Assir had undergone physical changes in appearance and attire, with a shaved beard and new clothing style and facial modifications suggesting the use of plastic surgery. See Bassam, Laila. "Lebanon detains hardline Islamist cleric." *Reuters*, August 15, 2015, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-security-idUSKCN0QK09920150815>.

procedures in Abuja, including the security checks at the airport, though he was probably not acting alone. Naturally, the incident added fuel to the blame game and conspiracy fires, as the local state polity drew its sword towards religious institutions and various Salafi movements. Allegations of Judeo-Christian instigation under a Christian head-of-state, Goodluck Jonathan (2009-2015), were never proven even if they preoccupied many.

Ironically, and under the new Muslim President, Muhammadu Buhari, there has been no pause in bloodshed as the Boko Haram insurrection continued unabated. Between May 29 and December 31, 2015, for example, media reports indicated that over 300 people were killed in the northeast, particularly in Borno and Yobe. Most of the deaths were by suicide bombers who targeted public spaces such as mosques and markets. Equally troubling developments were recorded between 2015 and 2017, given that Boko Haram has continually targeted not only state security operatives and institutions, but also aimed for its critics from within and outside the Salafi household. Its men attacked Shaykh Muhammad Awwal Adam Albani in Zaria on the night of February 1, 2014, and murdered the cleric, his wife, and their son. Similar killings occurred on a regular basis. To be sure, Shaykh Albani was a fierce critic of the Boko Haram although three other leading clerics, Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1919-1999), Muhammad b. al-'Uthaymin (1925-2001) and 'Abd Allah b. Baz (1910-1999) provided the canonical imprimatur to the Nigerian Salafi tradition. Boko Haram, and some of its opponents, freely appropriated and continue to interpret their teachings, with little regard to their applicability in the African context.³³

(33) Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria, op. cit.*, 193-239.

The Military Response to Boko Haram Suicide Sortie



Sequel to the August 11, 2015 Suicide Attack at Sabongari Village Market in Dambuwal LG. Army and Boko Haram reportedly clashed in Maiduguri.

Courtesy Channels TV


Boko Haram Shekau Declares Allegiance



Abubakar Shekau on March 7, 2015 declaring *bay'a* to ISIS Ibrahim Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Statistics of Human Loss

Reported civilian deaths in Boko Haram attacks Sep 2010 - 17 May 2014



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, created by Prof. Clionadh Raleigh, University of Sussex.

Internally Displaced Persons Reject Relocation to Home States



August 7, 2015. Internally Displaced Persons reject offer of free relocation and transportation offered by Governor Adams Oshiomole (Edo State) in Nigeria.

The Boko Haram and “Islamic State” Partnership

On March 7, 2015, Shekau declared his *bay‘a* (allegiance) to the self-appointed Caliph Ibrahim Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who may be the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS). Given that the Boko Haram is not a monolithic body, several factions with discordant ideological and tactical bents exist within it, which begs the question whether the Shekau declaration was personal or on behalf of the movement. Moreover, and since ethnic affiliations have not failed to play a divisive role within the group, this question was doubly pertinent. We know, for example, that in 2011 a splinter group—the Jama‘at Ansar al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-*Sudan* (Assembly of Helpers of Muslims in Sudanic Africa)—emerged, and became popularly known as the Ansaru. Its leader was one Mamman Nur, who aligned his organization more with al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) than with Boko Haram. He trained its followers under AQIM to the extent of having a new and “glocalized” interpretation of jihad. In short Nur wished to emphasize greater regional collaboration without, it seems, losing touch with global and local organizations.³⁴ Researchers who looked into this aspect of Nur’s activities unearthed evidence of his “friendship” with Sahelian militant groups such as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa that, naturally, raised security concern for various governments. Equally important were the attacks on foreign tourists and institutions, most notably the UN mission’s office in Abuja in August 2011, the kidnappings and murder of French tourists, as well as the bombing of hotels patronized by foreign nationals. In fact, attacks on West African hotels frequented by Westerners smacked as little more than competition among rival terror groups with different franchises from the global terror networks, which may well lead to greater security concerns not only in the region, but also globally.³⁵ There are also references by some

(34) Ufiem M. Ogbonnaya, Kanayo Ogujiuba and Nancy Stiegler, “Terrorism in Nigeria: Implications of Boko Haram’s Movement for Security and Stability in the ECOWAS sub-region,” *African Security Review* 23:2 (2014), 145-60; see also Zenn—Nigerian al-Qaedaism, *op. cit.*

(35) Lebovich, Andrew. “The Hotel Attacks and Militant Realignment in the Sahara-Sahel Region,” *CTC Sentinel* 9:1 (January 2016), 22-28.

political observers and analysts to internal discrimination cases, such as that of Kogi Boko Haram, Kanuri Boko Haram, and Hausa Fulani Boko Haram.³⁶ Although evidence of Saudi Wahhabism is not altogether lacking in any one of these three sub-groups' ideological discourses, as can be ascertained from their appropriation of the Salafi triumvirate of al-Albani, 'Uthaymin and Ibn Baz, their influences on Boko Haram itself have been exaggerated. In fact, it may be accurate to state that even the Boko Haram operational tactics and *Weltanschauung* have been rightly shown to be outside Wahhabi norms, no matter the inferences by several scholars.³⁷

Proposals for A Solution

In light of this discussion, it may be useful to offer a few recommendations, perhaps even advance a few solutions to best deal with the Boko Haram phenomenon. A recent publication issued by the Tony Blair Faith Foundation aimed to help decision makers and analysts. It advanced a series of integrated approaches to solving global extremism, insurgency, and radicalism, among other social perverse phenomena. While their conclusions were sound, the bottom line was to match the commitment that Jihadis have shown to their cause, with the need to instrumentalize the use of religion in the public sphere that focuses on education and social welfare.³⁸ Indeed, most of the proposals in the immensely useful tome edited by Koser and Thorp can indeed be adapted to the African environment, specifically the Boko Haram phenomenon and its cognates. For it is now amply clear that the radicalization of youth and the making of teenage suicide bombers in Nigeria would have to be ultimately attributed to unemployment or underemployment, as well as grinding and

(36) Agbiboa, *op. cit.*

(37) De Montclos, *op. cit.*, 141. See also Ross Valentine, Simon. *Force and Fanaticism: Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Beyond* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2015), 252.

(38) Khalid Koser and Thomas Thorp, eds., *How to Prevent Extremism and Policy Options*, London: Tony Blair Faith Foundation, London, 2015, available at http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/sites/default/files/How%20to%20Prevent_Global%20Perspectives%20Vol%202_0.pdf.

pervasive poverty. This is along with the state's failure to provide dividends of good governance in terms of education, health, security and other social services. It was the absence of such provisions that earned the Boko Haram its initial dedicated support. A well-coordinated project of de-radicalization should therefore be put in place to address what is sorely lacking in Nigerian society, namely socio-political equality, along with the even-handed opportunities that may well allow citizens to thrive, prosper, and add value.³⁹

There is also the need to provide and sustain mechanisms and opportunities for legitimate possibilities for upward social mobility with unfettered and prompt justice to correct real or perceived imbalances. It is when people realize that such mechanisms and opportunities are lacking that some lean towards radicalization. Hopelessness seems to have been promoted to the level of fate among ordinary Nigerians. Additionally, the Muslim World has failed to live up to its responsibilities for a number of reasons, which include a poor understanding of the reality on ground, and fear of Western blackmail towards Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) whose assistance is sometimes unjustly believed to act as conduit to terrorist organizations. The best illustrations of this phenomenon relate to the Saudi Al-Haramayn Foundation, the Iqra' Trust, the Kuwaiti Zakat Fund, among others, whose activities ceased in African countries after several Western media outlets, along with engaged Christian-faith inspired NGOs and humanitarian organizations, mischievously accused them of illegal activities. Muslim states were blamed for allegedly organizing "soul-winning" enterprises with negative connotations and consequences.

Inasmuch as non-Islamic faith-inspired charities such as Christian Aid and the World Jewish Relief, among others, are working to alleviate suffering across the world, perhaps the time has come to do likewise. Just like the

(39) Jean-Luc Marret, and Gonul Tol, eds, «Understanding Deradicalization: Pathways to Enhance Transatlantic Common Perceptions and Practices.» Washington D.C.: Middle East Institute, June 10, 2015, available at <http://www.mei.edu/content/article/understanding-deradicalization-pathways-enhance-transatlantic-common-perceptions-and-practices>.

Catholic Church—which mainly organizes its believers through various religious orders to provide about a quarter of the care to HIV Aids patients in Africa—does, there is nothing that prevents Muslim agencies for leaving their palpable imprints, by adopting similar assistance efforts to help the needy. For it should be very clear by now that if orthodox and enlightened Muslim authorities will not facilitate the diffusion of true Islam through proper and coordinated channels and procedures, perverse religious and ethical standards and ethos can be spread by deviant groups, including the likes of Boko Haram. Consequently, there is an urgent need to assist in providing what people actually require, based on their own particularities and necessities, not what we think they require or need. Similarly, there is also the obligation to encourage interreligious dialogue within and across religious divides (Sunni/Shi'a; Salafi/Sufi; modernists/traditionalists; Muslim/Christian), all of which should be promoted by state and non-governmental establishments. Their recommendations ought to be sustained and reach decision-makers at the highest levels of our governments.⁴⁰

For in the end, an integrated de-radicalization program can be put in place. While it is a pity that the Organization of Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, among others, have not created a comprehensive network of programs and/or projects that would be particularly targeted towards Sudanic African states in the tradition of the British Council, USAID, various European Union funds and similar institutions, it is never too late. Towards that end, it is proposed that the King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies—ideally suited to co-ordinate such an effort given its respectable and esteemed position across the Muslim world as an intellectual center and a repository of Islamic heritage and intellectualism—be entrusted with such a mission. Relying on strong institutions, not personalities, would ensure a sustainable plan for human capacity building in Sudanic Africa, a

(40) Hakeem Onapajo and Abubakar A. Usman, "Fueling the Flames: Boko Haram and Deteriorating Christian-Muslim Relations in Nigeria," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 35:1 (2015), 106-22.

veritable tool against youth militancy. Such an institutional emphasis might well ensure the prevalence of the rule of law against violence by the state and other actors and interlocutors.⁴¹

There can of course be no single, quick-fix solution, a master key of a sort that could resolve the various manifestations of Jihadism in Sudanic Africa, as some of the research studies, policy statements, and debates in the Western discursive tradition propose. In the end, local causes, which could be of the most varied types, should be taken into consideration.⁴² The transformation of Boko Haram into a regional network of terror by the IS recognition of Abubakar Shekau as the titular head or a *walī* (administrator) for West Africa, clearly indicates a new phase, whose implications are better imagined than experienced if something concrete is not done and in good time too.⁴³ We now know how ongoing crises in the Middle East and North Africa, which have created serious human catastrophes in numerous countries, along with a serious migration problem across Europe where millions are seeking asylum, affects hundreds of millions. An undetermined number of economic refugees, including many from African states, have joined these refugee populations in recent years, which clearly means that the relatively secure parts of the world can ill afford another stream. Africans who are the victims of local or regional insurgencies will doubtless continue to add to everyone's burden as their own insecurity and genuine economic disequilibrium compel them to migrate as well. It behooves the relatively more peaceful Muslim countries with a better economic profile to be in the vanguard, both to fulfill religious duties, and to alleviate ongoing sufferings as much as possible.

(41) See Corbett, *op. cit.*; see also Corbett, R. Rosemary. "Meta-data, Same-Sex Marriage and the Making of 'Terrorists'," *Culture and Religion: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 15:2 (2014), 187-97; and Amnesty International, "Stars on their Shoulders, Blood on their Hands: War Crimes committed by the Nigerian Military," AFR 44/1657/2015, June 2, 2015, available at <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4416572015ENGLISH.PDF>.

(42) Steinberg & Weber 2015: 7-12.

(43) Zenn 2015. "Wilayat West Africa Reboots for the Caliphate", *CTC Sentinel*, 8: 2, August 2015, 10-16.

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