Masarat
Number: 41
Author:
On 21 April 2019, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei announced the replacement of the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Aziz Jafari, with his deputy, Hossein Salami. This move caps an ongoing process of regeneration within the top echelons of the IRGC which has been ongoing since early 2017.
The decision to replace Jafari was due, but not entirely expected so soon after the White House designation of the IRGC as a terrorist group. Since 1997, Khamenei had placed an informal ten-year limit on the commandership of the IRGC. Aziz Jafari was therefore due to be replaced by 2017,
Number: 40
Author:
Iran’s government and foreign policy have been thrust into turmoil by the sudden resignation from his post and subsequent reinstatement of foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. The unexpected development adds to the increasing difficulty of the Hassan Rouhani administration to avoid slipping into the classic “lame-duck” position of presidential tenures approaching their end. With little over two years remaining of his second and last mandate, Rouhani is increasingly hemmed in by a growing inability to direct the key levers of policy, particularly the economic and foreign-policy components, and has now been hit by a salvo of unexpecte
Number: 39
Author:
Increased tensions between Syrian Kurds and Turkey resulting in cross-border shelling during the month of November underline the complex system of conflict unfolding in northern Syria with the emergence of a Kurdish-dominated federation across the Jazira (Hassaka and Qamishli) and Euphrates (Kobani and Tell Abyad), and encompassing more recently the Deir ez-Zour governorate and Raqqa. Afrin is also theoretically included in the structure but is nonetheless currently under Turkish occupation. In this mosaic, multiple local and regional forces with rivaling interactive agendas are complicating the final phase of the war against the so-called Islamic
Number: 38
Author:
This study attempts to shed light on the geopolitical importance of the Red Sea and attempts to find an approach to the definition of the Red Sea and the Maritime Strategy, in addition to highlighting Saudi Arabia's efforts to preserve the security of the Red Sea, which is a common Arab security front. Many Arab states bordering the Red Sea share the collective responsibility to protect it. The Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandab Strait are the main entrance points of the Red Sea and for the security and navigation of it. The security of the Red Sea is part of the security of the surrounding countries, As well as its importance to the major Power
Number: 37
Author:
This article will situate the recent Aktau Agreement reached by all coastal states of the Caspian Sea within the context of Iran’s protracted quest for sovereignty over parts of the Caspian, an endeavor that has been in place since the emergence of boundary confrontations and diplomacy with its northern neighbors during the eighteenth century. It will seek to either verify or dispel myths and rumors that have emerged within Iranian public opinion on the extent of territorial waters and coastline that Iran is entitled to, and has exercised control over during the past few centuries. The role of public opinion is heightened by the extent of popular
Number: 36
Author:
Tehran’s rekindled, yet dangerously more assertive role in Syria is testament to its efforts to expand strategic depth, ranging from Iraq, over the Shia-offshoot Alawite-dominated heartland in Syria, to the Mediterranean shores in both Syria and Lebanon. In that context, asserting leverage in the Golan Heights represents a vital element in the larger struggle to connect the dots of an Iranian-controlled arc of influence across the Levant.
In doing so, Iran will likely draw from lessons learned in its substantial, for the most part successful, and well-documented tool of statecraft, namely, the s
Number: 35
Author:
The Kurdish referendum has been perceived by the neighboring countries as a threat to their national security, territorial integrity, and, of course, their regional policies. The international community has also ignored the right to self-determination practiced by the Kurds. This paper seeks to identify options open to the Kurds in the aftermath of the referendum. Whether or not successful, the Kurdish referendum is one of the only referendums exercised in the region since the establishment of the nation-state in the Middle East. Consequently, the referendum will have a significant impact on the ethnic politics of region for years to come. The paper, t
Number: 34
Author:
The growing ideological gap between the Islamic state and its people, particularly youth and women, has never been wider in Iran. Women and youth advocating modern and Western lifestyles and norms are undermining the regime’s Islamic legitimacy. This article examines the hard-liners’ attempt to re-revolutionize Iran and to bring back the ideological Islamic values that increase the likelihood of societal insecurity and domestic disorder. Through this lens, it attempts to explore the increasing discontent among a large segment of Iranians, including liberal and secular groups, women’s rights groups, and the ever-increasing sociopolitic
Number: 34
Author:
The recent ratcheting up of tension between the Trump administration and the Islamic Republic has cast the spotlight once again on the regional activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the controversial elite body that handles most of Iran’s regional Middle Eastern policy. Caught on the defensive after the substantial failure of candidates considered to be allied, or very close to it, in the May 2017 presidential elections in Iran, such as Ebrahim Raisi and Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the IRGC has also been hit by an increasing offensive coordinated by the president, Hassan Rouhani, against its sprawling domestic economic empire. Y
Number: 33
Author:
On July 21, 2017, Lebanese Hezbollah fighters initiated an assault across the Qalamoun Mountains near Arsal in northern Lebanon’s Baalbek-Hermel governorate. Soon joined by the Syrian air force, the offensive was aimed at rooting out pockets of entrenched fighters affiliated with the former Syrian al-Qaeda branch, Jabhat al-Nusra, which was relabeled in 2016 as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS).
Just one week after the onset of the operation, Hezbollah declared victory over the militants who were stranded in the contested Jroud Arsal region. As an immediate result, the belligerent parties struck a deal, which was mediated and confirmed by Lebanon’s Gener